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On January 13, Germany’s new chancellor, Angela Merkel, 
will have her first official visit with US President George W. 
Bush. Washington, or at least the part of Washington that 
still pays attention to transatlantic issues, not just the Bush 
administration, will be glad to see her given that she is not 
her US-bashing predecessor Gerhard Schroeder. Though this 
change in atmosphere is welcome, no one should make too 
much of it. It is unlikely to make much difference on security 
issues, where Iran’s own actions are forcing the United States 
and Germany to come together, where German public opinion 
will keep the governments apart on Iraq, and where neither 
country is prepared to make major changes to defense budgets 
and approaches. The Masri case will certainly limit Merkel’s 
interest  in  appearing  too  chummy  with  Bush  on  security 
matters.1
Where Chancellor Merkel will find several opportunities to 
take a new and constructive tack is on transatlantic economic 
relations. German-American foreign policy tensions over the 
1.  Khalid el-Masri, a German national, was forcibly transported by the CIA 
from Macedonia to an Afghan prison by acknowledged mistake as part of the US 
“rendition” of terrorists.  This became a cause célèbre in Germany and through-
out western Europe and dominated press coverage of US Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice’s meetings with Merkel in Berlin in December 2005. 
Iraq war indeed have failed to spill over into the economic 
sphere, consistent with the pattern of most of the postwar 
period. Underneath this amity, however, remain several 
real and troubling economic challenges that only explicit 
intergovernmental action can resolve. The lack of policy actions 
to address these challenges in recent years, let alone of direct 
cooperation between the German and American governments 
to deal with them more fundamentally, has created a situation 
where the United States urgently needs Germany’s help in the 
form of economic leadership.
All these issues concern Germany’s role in guiding the 
European  Union  toward  more  liberal  stances  and  greater 
economic engagement beyond EU borders. With the United 
Kingdom having squandered its six months in the rotating 
EU presidency, and in fact having alienated some of the more 
promarket newer member states of eastern Europe over the 
EU budget, the need for Germany to speak up on economics 
within Europe is more dire than ever. Its capability to do so 
has been enhanced with Merkel having resolved this year’s EU 
budget crisis through her deft diplomacy upon taking office.
Ironically,  as  Germany  in  recent  years  has  emphasized 
its relationships within Europe, it has shown less leadership 
of Europe. This has disappointed and increasingly frustrated 
Washington, particularly American multilateralists. The United 
States has for decades counted on Germany to be the decisive 
swing vote between French and British views on economic and 
security issues and more broadly to encourage the European 
Union to look responsibly beyond the mutual protection of 
national interests. 
While the United States cannot offer as much directly on 
the security front to Germany as it did during the Cold War, 
Germany’s postwar economic leadership was always more in 
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its own self-interest than simply payback for the American 
security  guarantee.  In  fact,  as  globalization  proceeds  and 
economic performance in the eurozone continues to stall, 
it is all the more important for Germany to keep the global 
economy open and stable.2 Germany was once again the 
number one exporter in the world in 2005, and net exports 
have  been  the  primary  source  of  growth  in  the  German 
economy in recent years.
At the same time, by showing leadership in these crucial 
economic  issues,  the  new  German  government  is  likely 
to  elicit  more  constructive  behavior  from  US  officials  in 
areas where bullying or disregard of EU views has become 
increasingly the norm. If US officials see the economies of 
continental Europe in general, and Germany in particular, 
as  declining  and  their  international  economic  policies  as 
fecklessly pursuing narrow state-sponsored advantages, then 
such disregard can become increasingly destabilizing for the 
global economy.
The key areas of German opportunity and US need are 
reducing agricultural subsidies, coordinating on relations with 
China, and securing the flow of international investment.
Buying Out AgriculturAl PrOtectiOn 
Recent discussions have thankfully already made it trite to 
recognize that agricultural trade liberalization would do more 
than almost anything else to bring the developing world out 
of poverty (Cline 2004 and references therein). It has also 
become obvious that in the absence of such liberalization, 
the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations will fail. 
The rich world’s resistance to liberalization ultimately rests 
upon the ability of France and Poland to subsidize their 
farmers using the European Union’s common agricultural 
policy (CAP) rather than buying them out. If Germany can 
get the French and Polish governments to do what it did 
to reduce its workforce of coal miners in decades past—and 
what South Korea is committed to doing to buy out its own 
2. Posen (2005a) argues for the self-interest of Germany, as well as the global 
interest, in Germany securing globalization by asserting leadership of the 
European Union on economic liberalization.
 
farmers—then the dominoes will have little choice but to 
fall in Tokyo and Washington as well (particularly after the 
official statement made at the APEC Economic Leaders 
Meeting  in  November  2005,  which  put  the  ball  in  the 
European Union’s court).3 
Only Germany has the bilateral economic relationships 
and the sizable EU net donor position to give it real influence 
over French and Polish policy, and every prior trade round has 
depended upon Germany to step up precisely this way. Past 
instances of such leadership relied upon German industrial 
exporters prevailing upon the German government to base 
its policies on the overall stake of the German economy in 
the trading system. But for the past few years Germany has 
gone in the opposite direction, with Schroeder caving in to 
French President Jacques Chirac’s agricultural demands and 
leaving the United Kingdom out to dry on its EU budget 
proposals to link its rebate to CAP reform. 
Merkel could save the Doha round by reinterpreting 
the budget deal just made on agricultural support funds at 
the EU summit. Germany can keep the agreed amount of 
money for the EU agriculture budget unchanged but use 
that money in different ways than export subsidies and other 
trade-distorting agricultural aid.4 So doing would remove 
a  transatlantic  conflict  (and  threat  of  the  United  States 
legitimately scapegoating the European Union) while helping 
the poor countries. Merkel could even offset some of the drag 
on German consumption from her own proposed sales tax 
increase by getting German food cheaper, making it more 
worthwhile for her to go up against Germany’s neighbors. 
This  would  be  a  good  payoff  for  a  return  to  traditional 
German leadership in EU trade policy and something the 
United  States  would  be  grateful  for  but  cannot  by  itself 
achieve.
cOOrdinAting On relAtiOns with chinA 
China’s  rise  is  more  than  just  an  economic  issue,  but 
Germany and most other EU countries treat it that way. In 
3. “We call for breaking the current impasse in agricultural negotiations, in 
particular in market access, which will unblock other key areas…,” APEC 
Economic Leaders Statement on Doha Development Agenda Negotiations, 
13th APEC Economic Leaders Meeting, Busan, South Korea, November 19, 
2005.
4.  A claim could be made that all the EU states just committed to not 
reopening the budget deal on agriculture until at least 2009.  But, as with the 
Stability and Growth Pact, the EU Takeover Code, the EU Services Directive, 
and so on, all intergovernmental agreements within the European Union are 
subject to renegotiation in the guise of reinterpretation if the major states 
decide to do so.  There is certainly no reason the French and Polish should get 
away with keeping the CAP deal  more sacrosanct than all the other deals.
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fact, Europe free rides on and occasionally tries to exploit 
American willingness to stand up to China—when political 
tensions rise across the Pacific, European premiers are eager 
to make a trip to Beijing to land Airbus contracts or sell 
their country’s other products at the expense of American 
competitors.  This  reflects  both  a  divergence  in  threat 
perceptions between the European Union and the United 
States and sheer opportunism. On both counts, it is a short-
sighted strategy, and one likely to reinforce American beliefs 
that Europe cannot be trusted to take a responsible approach 
to security issues. Merkel cannot change this overnight with 
one  initiative,  and  unilaterally  holding  back  Germany’s 
commercial  opportunism  would  simply  offer  other  EU 
countries even more room to swoop in for Chinese sales. 
What Merkel can do, in both Germany and America’s 
interests, is pick specific issues where Germany can encourage 
coordination with the United States on relations with China 
in the G-7 and in Brussels. So doing would reduce conflicts 
between China and the United States by credibly closing off 
China’s ability to play on western divisions in some areas 
and thus increasing the Chinese incentive to cooperate—it 
would also diminish the overall divergence in views on China 
between the United States and its European allies. In fact, 
Germany could in cooperation with the United Kingdom 
push for a reorganization of EU representation in both the 
formal international institutions (such as the UN Security 
Council) and the G-7/8, such that a new G-12 or G-20 
could emerge, which would give voice to China and other 
major emerging markets. A cutback in the number of seats 
allotted to European nations would be necessary to keep the 
groups workable but would serve the ultimate German goal 
of strengthening the representation and role of Europe. In the 
face of such a consolidation, the United States would in its 
own interest have to give more recognition to the importance 
of a coherent European voice on the world stage.
A good place to start would be for Europe to join the 
United States in pushing for a Chinese currency revaluation. 
European  leaders  have  publicly  and  privately  suggested 
that the confrontational American approach to getting the 
Chinese government to revalue the yuan is mistaken. Merkel 
should take advantage of the American bad cop role to play 
good cop rather than just standing by. In particular, under 
German urging, the eurozone can offer to consolidate its 
constituencies  and  shares  in  the  International  Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank in return for a revaluation of the 
yuan and other Asian currencies.5 The eurozone could shift 
several percent of its shares to China, Japan, and others, and 
still retain a large enough share both to exceed that of the 
United States and to retain effective veto; the United States 
could also cut its quota as part of making the redistribution 
of voting accurately reflect the changed world. 
If the United States continues to face China alone on 
the currency issue, the Chinese government is unlikely to 
move the yuan peg meaningfully. In that case, any dollar 
declines  will  fall  primarily  on  the  euro  to  adjust,  and 
protectionist sentiments in the United States will continue 
to rise—the United States and Germany have a common 
interest in avoiding this outcome. On the other hand, if 
China does not respond to the eurozone offer, Germany and 
the European Union will have lost nothing but still added 
consolidating and strengthening eurozone representation to 
the international financial agenda and shown solidarity with 
the United States that can pay off later should the dollar 
move sharply against the euro. 
stemming the sPreAd Of resistAnce 
tO fOreign OwnershiP 
One would think that after decades of the most backward 
developing countries demonstrating the economic costs of 
kicking  or  keeping  out  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI), 
resistance  to  foreign  ownership  would  be  a  dying  issue. 
Instead,  this  sentiment  is  growing.  Just  recently,  the  US 
Congress  de  facto  blocked  a  Chinese  company  (China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation [CNOOC]) from taking 
over  strategically  unimportant  Unocal,  and  the  German 
government  threatened  its  largest  bank  not  to  consider 
international  mergers  in  order  to  maintain  a  national 
champion  in  financial  services.  With  Germany  and  the 
United States setting these examples, France, Italy, Japan, 
Russia, and a host of emerging markets have encouraged 
their own barriers to cross-border ownership and rejected 
recent bids from abroad for their companies. 
5.  See Posen (2005b) for a discussion of this proposal from the Asian perspec-
tive.  Broader discussions of the virtues of consolidating eurozone representa-
tion in international financial organizations are provided in Henning (1997) 
and Truman (2005a).
.  Truman (2005b) gives an estimate of how much the euro would appreciate 
under various scenarios of Asian currency movement when the US current 
account adjusts.
If the United States continues to 
face China alone on the currency 
issue, the Chinese government is 
unlikely to move the yuan peg.N u m b e r   Pb0 6 - 1                                                                                                                                                                                       J A Nu ArY   2 0 0 6

Aging, high-savings Germany cannot afford to lose the 
investment opportunities that FDI outflows would yield, and 
the moribund German services sector can only gain from 
FDI inflows, which infuse knowledge from abroad. Both 
US and German multinationals would lose efficiency and 
returns to capital from a hostile environment toward foreign 
ownership and investment. By living up to the European 
Union’s own stated rules for takeovers, and thus reversing her 
predecessor’s blockage of their implementation, Merkel could 
help bring both the United States and Germany’s neighbors 
to  their  senses.  The  tit-for-tat  spiral  of  ad  hoc  decisions 
against foreign bidders could then be stopped before more 
noxious legislative barriers are erected around the world. All 
this would help protect the ties between economies, encour- 
aging continued cross-border integration of production as 
well as flows of capital, regardless of what happens in the 
trade round.
In practical terms, the United States and Germany could 
reverse the effect of their recent actions to block cross-border 
mergers  by  simplifying  the  process  in  three  ways:  First, 
they could agree on a narrow definition of what constitutes 
a  “national  security”  exception  to  the  presumption  that 
cross-border mergers should be allowed (subject to equally 
well-defined  antitrust  concerns).7  Germany  as  both  a 
leading member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) and a huge investor in the United States is well-
positioned  to  convene  a  substantive  intergovernmental 
working  group  on  this.  Second,  the  United  States  and 
Germany  should  bring  accounting  standards  negotiations 
to a close, which would remove uncertainty for prospective 
investors. Despite the costly imposition of Sarbanes-Oxley 
legislation in the United States, there is still room for some 
common  principles  for  public  companies,  and  Germany 
represents one of the major alternative points of view to that 
of the United States. Third, President Bush and Chancellor 
Merkel should make statements, perhaps jointly with other 
7.  Graham and Marchick (forthcoming) discuss in more detail the reasons to 
limit narrow considerations of national security exceptions in the US invest-
ment approval process.
 
western and Japanese leaders, publicly repudiating the often-
invoked image of foreign investors as “vultures” who prey 
on domestic businesses and employees. Pointed speeches in 
this case would actually mean a great deal, given the populist 
anticapitalist rhetoric invoked by German officials in the 
spring of 2005 and the silent acceptance by President Bush 
of the congressional overreaction to the CNOOC bid in the 
summer of 2005. 
AMERICA CANNOT DO IT ALONE
 
Resolving the current deadlocks over trade negotiations and 
currency adjustment and defusing the increasing momentum 
of  economic  nationalism  with  regard  to  cross-border 
investment are the most pressing issues on the economic 
policy agenda. They are also areas where substantive 
agreement in the German-American relationship is feasible 
on the basis of common interest and where such agreement 
would have significant positive impact on EU and thus global 
policy  outcomes.  Other  areas  where  German  leadership 
over the longer term could benefit the United States are in 
relations with Turkey, by putting more economic meat on 
the vague “privileged partnership” Chancellor Merkel has 
already offered that critical nation, and in public investment 
in  the  development  of  future  energy  technologies  (e.g., 
carbon  emission  sparing),  where  Germany  has  technical 
capabilities and huge popular support for progress (and will 
waste money on industrial policy in any event, so better for 
a good purpose). Germany reaching out in these ways will 
also directly benefit the German economy and the course of 
European integration.
Neither President Bush nor Chancellor Merkel should 
take transatlantic economic relations for granted just because 
they will get along better than he and her predecessor did. So 
doing would risk mounting conflicts for Germany (and the 
European Union) with the United States over relations with 
China, investment, and trade. So doing would also squander 
opportunities for Germany to simultaneously improve its 
own and the European economic outlook and to reestablish 
clearly the benefits to the United States of sharing leadership 
in global affairs with Germany and Europe. In fact, German-
American cooperation could be the basis for saving the Doha 
trade round. Reducing agricultural subsidies, coordinating on 
relations with China, and securing the flow of international 
investment are also issues where there simply is no American 
substitute  for  German  initiatives  on  the  international 
economic agenda—and the Bush administration certainly 
should,  and  probably  would,  welcome  the  progress  that 
German leadership could bring.
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